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FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND NON-
CONSENSUAL VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER INSPECTIONS OCCURRING
DURING TRAFFIC STOPS
The Supreme Court recently held that a police officer may enter a motor vehicle to
ascertain its vehicle identification number during an ordinary traffic stop for no rea-
son other than the observed traffic violation. This Note examines New York v. Class
within the context of a trend toward erosion offourth amendment rights. The author
asserts that Class was inconsistent with precedent, and proposes a state statute that
would guarantee the protections held inapplicable under the federal Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
IN THE PAST, the Supreme Court has analyzed the permissible
scope of police intrusions involving automobiles in certain con-
texts,' but not specifically within the context of vehicle identifica-
tion number (VIN) inspections occurring during stops for traffic
infractions. As a result of the Court's recent decision in New York
v. Class,2 however, the issue has been decided: police officers may
now enter the interior of a vehicle during a traffic stop in order to
search for a VIN without articulating any reasonable justification
for the intrusion other than the observed traffic violation. This
holding poses an immediate threat to the fourth amendment rights3
1. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (police may search automobile or its
occupant for weapons if officer reasonably believes suspect is armed or has immediate access
to weapons, thereby posing threat to officer's safety); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982) (police, with legal stop of vehicle and probable cause to believe it contains contraband,
may search entire vehicle and all containers within it capable of housing object of officer's
suspicion); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (upon lawful custodial arrest of driver,
police may conduct search of passenger compartment of vehicle, including any containers
found within); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (upon lawful impoundment
of vehicle, police may conduct routine inventory search, and may search for dangerous in-
strumentalities); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (border patrol may
stop vehicle only if aware of specific articulable facts warranting suspicion that vehicle con-
tains illegal aliens); see also infra notes 63-106 and accompanying text.
2. 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
[Tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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of the "countless" 4 numbers of motorists who are stopped for rou-
tine traffic infractions every day.
The VIN is a serial number,5 unique to each vehicle and re-
quired on all cars.6 A VIN may be located in one of three display
configurations, each of which activates a different legal approach.
For cars manufactured after 1969, federal law requires that the VIN
be displayed so that it is readable through the windshield, from
outside the vehicle.7 Dashboard VINs create few, if any, fourth
amendment problems, since the police officer need not enter the ve-
hicle to access the VIN. For cars manufactured prior to 1969, how-
ever, the VIN is located on the vehicle's doorjamb. An
investigating officer must open the door in order to read the infor-
mation.8 Upon opening the vehicle's door, areas and items within
the car, not otherwise exposed to observation, come into the plain
view9 of the officer, and are then seizable if they constitute evidence
of crime. The third situation involves the case where, for whatever
reason, the post-1969 dashboard VIN is obscured by papers or
other personal effects. It is the second and third situations which
are affected by the Supreme Court's new VIN search rule.
Undoubtedly, governmental regulation of automobile traffic and
highway safety' ° is both desirable and necessary. However, where
areas of privacy, such as the interior of a car, are protected from
4. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
5. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 565.4, 571.115 (1985).
6. The VIN consists of more than a dozen digits, and can be used to ascertain make,
model, engine type and place of manufacture. For further discussion of the function of a
VIN, see infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
7. 49 C.F.R. § 571.115 (54.6) (1985) requires that the VIN be "readable, without mov-
ing any part of the vehicle, through the vehicle glazing under daylight lighting conditions.
.See also New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960, 963 (1986).
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-4-4 (1985) is typical of state statutes which regulate the location of
the VIN. It reads, in pertinent part:
(a) The identification numbers... shall be placed upon the passenger car and
component parts by the manufacturer thereof.
(b) . . . The numbers may be affixed by any suitable manufacturing process
that will result in the numbers becoming a permanent part of the passenger car or
component.
(c) The identification numbers shall be of a height and width easily readable by
the naked eye. They may consist of letters, digits, or any combination of them.
(d) The identification numbers may be in accordance with recommended prac-
tices approved by the Society of Automotive Engineers as to material, lettering,
manufacturing, and installation.
(e) Vehicle identification numbers shall be easily accessible for inspection.
Id.
8. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963. For a discussion of the different VIN locations and the
search problems they create, see infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
9. The Plain View Doctrine is discussed infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the traditional pervasive governmental regulation of the automo-
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unreasonable searches and seizures by the fourth amendment,"1 the
law developed to date requires that the police articulate a concrete
reason for entering the car. 2 It should be noted initially that, in the
prototypical VIN search case, the officer has stopped the vehicle
after observing an actual violation of traffic law. As such, probable
cause for the initial seizure has been supplied. 3 The probable cause
does not, however, justify a search of the vehicle.
New York v. Class,'4 recently decided by the United States
Supreme Court,"5 presents the paradigmatic situation involving a
non-consensual vehicle identification number search. In Class, the
defendant driver was stopped for speeding and driving with a bro-
ken windshield.16 The defendant exited his car and spoke with one
officer while the other, Officer McNamee, went directly to the de-
fendant's car and attempted to read the dashboard VIN through the
windshield. 7 The VIN was obscured by papers resting on the dash-
board, though, and Officer McNamee opened the door to remove
them. 8 Upon doing so, McNamee saw a gun protruding from un-
derneath the seat, and the defendant was promptly arrested.' 9
Reversing the conviction below, the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that, absent any kind of justification to believe that the
vehicle was stolen, a police officer could not engage in a non-consen-
bile and police enforcement of those regulations, see infra notes 45-52 and accompanying
text.
11. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in one's automobile.
12. United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1011 (1971)
(VIN inspection is search for fourth amendment purposes, and requires officer to have legiti-
mate grounds for checking number); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967)
(even if not a search for fourth amendment purposes, police must have legitimate reason to
check VIN); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965) (non-consensual entry
into automobile to copy VIN is illegal search, requires probable cause and search warrant).
For a discussion of the probable cause/reasonable suspicion requirement, see infra notes 68-
72 and accompanying text.
13. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Court per curiam held that,
where the police had observed the defendant driving with expired license tags, "there [was]
no question about the propriety of the initial restrictions on respondent's freedom of move-
ment." Id. at 109.
14. 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
15. The case was decided February 25, 1986.
16. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963.
17. Id. "It is undisputed that the police officers had no reason to suspect that [defend-
ant's] car was stolen .... Id.
18. Id. The defendant was not given an opportunity to comply with a demand to re-
move the papers from the dashboard so that the officers could read the VIN from outside of
the car.
19. Id.
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sual entry to inspect the VIN during a traffic stop. ° Nevertheless,
the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,21 reversed the
New York Court of Appeals and held it constitutionally
permissable for a police officer to enter a vehicle during a traffic stop
to search for a VIN not visible from the outside without having to
articulate any suspicion that the vehicle was stolen.22
It is the position of this Note that a stop for a traffic infraction
does not in itself justify access to a non-visible identification number
and the private areas within a vehicle. The Note begins by discuss-
ing fourth amendment principles of law, as applied to automobiles
generally and to VINs specifically, and the role of governmental
regulation in defining these constitutional protections. 23 It also ex-
plores the Plain View Doctrine and its implications in the VIN in-
spection problem.24 The next section traces the traditional methods
of governmental access to private automobiles under various law
enforcement theories, and attempts to illustrate how the Class rule
is manifestly inconsistent with these precedents.2 ' Finally, the Note
proposes a model statute for use by the states in order to afford their
citizens the protections which have been rendered non-existent by
the Court's recent search and seizure decision.26 This statute is
consistent with precedent and heeds the danger of promulgating
bright line rules2" in this area.
20. People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181, 184
(1984). The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether probable cause or
some lesser justification would be appropriate, since "here there was no semblance of either."
Id.
21. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opin-
ion, in which Chief Justice Burger joined. Justice Brennan dissented, in which Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens joined. Justice White filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Stevens joined.
22. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968-69.
23. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 63-106 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 107-37 and accompanying text.
27. "Bright line" rules are rules which are amenable to mechanical application in all
cases. However, in terms of fourth amendment principles, the "[s]pecific content and inci-
dents of this right [to be free from unreasonable searches] must be shaped by the context in
which it is asserted." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoted in United States v. Powers,
439 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1011 (1971)). Bright line rules are danger-
ous, because their results are arbitrary. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[C]ourts should carefully consider the facts and circumstances of
each search and seizure, focusing on the reasons supporting the [search incident to arrest]
exception rather than on any bright-line rule of general application.").
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I. VINs AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Subjects of Fourth Amendment Protection Generally
For fourth amendment purposes, whether a search28 has oc-
curred depends on the nature of the privacy interest allegedly vio-
lated by a government official. The Supreme Court has held that
the fourth amendment is intended to protect an individual's "legiti-
mate expectation" of privacy, even while that person is in a public
area.29 As a second aspect of the protection, this expectation of
privacy must be one which society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.3 °
The Court has recognized a lesser expectation of privacy in an
automobile. In Delaware v. Prouse,31 the Supreme Court found
that, although an automobile is subject to pervasive governmental
regulation, an individual does possess a constitutionally cognizable
legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental
intrusion into his automobile. 32 In determining the nature of the
privacy interest in the vehicle (perhaps activating fourth amend-
ment protections), the Court has in the past inquired into whether
the officer exposes "areas or information to which he otherwise
would not have access."'33 Under this standard, items within view
of an officer standing outside of the vehicle are legally admissible,
because nothing has been exposed that was not already visible to the
public.34 This situation corresponds to the first VIN display scena-
rio, where the VIN is located on the dashboard and plainly visible
to anyone standing outside the car.
28. For purposes of this Note, a "search" is defined as a procedure, which "expose[s]
areas in which [the defendant's] privacy interests remain." Brief for Respondent at 19, New
York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986) (No. 84-1181) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
30. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984) (privacy interest only exists in areas where intimate activities which society has inter-
est in protecting take place).
31. 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (police stops solely designed to check driver's license and regis-
tration held unreasonable and violative of fourth amendment).
32. Id. at 662; see also Allen & Schaefer, Great Expectations: Privacy Rights in
Automobiles, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 99 (1979); Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished
Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 571 n.79 (1982) (discussion
of importance of role played by the automobile in American life). The Court in Class admits
as much in its opinion. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 965 ("A citizen does not surrender all the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.").
33. Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 17.
34. For a discussion of the Plain View Doctrine, see infra notes 53-62 and accompany-
ing text. Under this test, the Court held in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)
that a beeper placed on a car for surveillance purposes did nothing more than monitor the
car's open public conduct.
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B. The Role of the VIN in Fourth Amendment Analysis
Although commonly used for insurance reports,35 towing,36 and
vehicle registration information,3 7 the VIN functions primarily as a
theft detection device. 38 As a law enforcement tool, the VIN itself
possesses quasi-public attributes, 39 arguably justifying a reduced ex-
pectation of privacy.4' However, the fact that the VIN is a theft
detection device embossed on every vehicle on the road does not
determine the issue of access to a non-visible VIN during traffic
stops.4" The location of such data will be a major factor in the legal
analysis.42 However, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent from
35. United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1970) (insurance policies identify
vehicles by VINs). "In combination with state insurance laws, the VIN reduces the number
of those injured in accidents, who go uncompensated for lack of insurance." Class, 106 S. Ct.
at 964-65.
36. United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 1312 (5th Cir. 1978) (officer needed VIN to
tow arrestee's van).
37. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.02 (West Supp. 1986) (VIN is basic component of
automobile registration); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-116a (Supp. 1985) (upon application for a
VIN for a rebuilt car or a vehicle with questionable identification, owner must request high-
way patrol to conduct an inspection of the vehicle; if vehicle is not stolen or made up of any
stolen parts, highway patrol must issue a new VIN). See also Class, 106 S. Ct. at 965 ("In
conjunction with the State's registration requirements and safety inspections, the VIN helps
to ensure that automobile operators are driving safe vehicles.").
38. See Amendment of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 33 Fed. Reg. 10,207
(Fed. Highway Admin. 1968) (determination). "Alteration of [automobile] identification
numbers is one means to conceal evidence of theft. Prohibition of possession of automobiles
and automobile parts having altered identification numbers is rationally related to the preven-
tion of theft and the apprehension of thieves." People v. Sequin, 199 Colo. 381, 385, 609 P.2d
622, 625 (1980).
39. United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d at 647 (since VIN is used for manufacturer identifi-
cation, state registration, and insurance policies, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists
in VIN itself); United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1971) ("Since identifica-
tion numbers are, at the least, quasi-public information, a search of that part of the car dis-
playing the number is but a minimal invasion of a person's privacy."). See, e.g., Uniform
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act § 9(a)(5), 11 U.L.A. 438 (1955) (YIN
is integral part of automobile title).
40. The majority in Class relied upon this ground: "because of the important role played
by the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation of the automobile ... we hold that there
[is] no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN." New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960, 966
(1986). See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text for a general discussion of governmen-
tal regulation of automobiles.
41. But see People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 497-98, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1013, 483
N.Y.S.2d 181, 185 (1984) (Jones, J., dissenting). Justice Jones wrote, "The letters and digits
constituting the VIN . . . have no independent existence and are not susceptible of being
possessed by the owner .... The purpose of the VIN is to proclaim the identity of the vehicle,
a purpose quite inconsistent with any legitimate privacy interest of the owner." Id. This
view was echoed by the Supreme Court majority, which held that "there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the VIN." Class, 106 S. Ct. at 966.
42. United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1011
(1971) ("The two most significant factors affecting the legality of a search for identification
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New York v. Class, "[E]ven assuming that respondent had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the VIN, why is this relevant to
the question we decide? By focusing on the object of the search...
the Court misses the issue ... whether an interior search of the car
to discover that object was constitutional."43
In cases where the VIN is readily visible from outside the vehi-
cle, there is no need for the officer to intrude to ascertain the
number.'
C. Governmental Regulation of Automobiles
The historical role of the police as public protectors requires
them to engage in inspection and patrol duties.45 The problem inev-
itably becomes one of drawing the line between public service and
private intrusion.
Pervasive governmental regulation of automobiles has been used
by the Supreme Court to justify a "lesser" expectation of privacy in
vehicles than that found in less regulated areas such as the home.46
numbers are.., the mobility of a motor vehicle.., and.., the 'expectation of privacy' that a
person may reasonably claim for those parts of his vehicle where identification numbers are
posted." (citations omitted)). See also Hayes v. Florida, 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985) (while police
have law enforcement interest in fingerprints-they are quasi-public [as are VINs]-this is
not a legitimate basis for forcibly removing defendant from his home and detaining at police
station without probable cause or warrant). In United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441, 447
(5th Cir. 1970), Judge Godbold dissented, stating that even though the VIN has a quasi-
public function, it does not exempt the car itself from fourth amendment protection.
The other factor is, of course, the police officer's justification for entering the car. For a
discussion of automobile searches under present law, see infra notes 63-106 and accompany-
ing text.
43. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 971 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. This point was emphasized by the Class majority; see Class, 106 S. Ct. at 969. See
also United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1970) (looking underneath car in order
to read VIN on car's axle did not constitute search under fourth amendment).
45. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). In Cady, the Court observed how
an officer's "community caretaking function [is] totally divorced from the detection, investi-
gation, or acquisition of evidence" function which police also perform. Id. See also Cotton v.
United States, 371 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1967) ("a local police officer is 'in a very real sense
a guardian of the public peace and he has a duty in the course of his work to be alert for
suspicious circumstances, and, provided that he acts within constitutional limits, to investigate
whenever such circumstances indicate to him that he should do so.'" (emphasis added)
(quoting Frye v. United States, 315 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1963))).
46. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Since vehicles have traditionally
been subject to a complex web of governmental regulations, the Court reasoned that
automobiles cannot reasonably be expected to be exempt from governmental intrusion the
way one's home might be. Id. at 441. See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)
(seminal automobile exception case where Court traced fourth amendment difference between
vehicle and home to fourth amendment's roots in colonial America); Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) ("The configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may
dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated
1986]
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The Court has, however, firmly curtailed police discretion by hold-
ing that officers may not randomly stop cars for license checks
(under authority of a general regulatory/police power) without an
articulation of individualized suspicion.4" The Court refused to al-
low police a completely free reign in performing their duty of
preventing highway crime.4 8 The Court balanced an individual's
right to freedom from unreasonable governmental interference
against the government's admittedly vital interest in preventing
crime4 9 on the highways and found that, absent proof of a legiti-
mate governmental need to detain, the individual's rights domi-
nated."0 In other words, the burden was placed on the government
to justify such regulatory deprivations of liberty.5'
In light of the Court's attitude that random highway vehicle
stops may not be conducted without an articulation of individual-
ized suspicion, there is reason for concern when faced with a deci-
sion such as Class, which appears to be a significant step in the
property."). But see Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a Public
Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 413 n.200
(1986) (home is regulated, "yet no one would suggest that these regulations result in a lower
expectation of privacy").
The Supreme Court recently dismissed the plain view justification, and based an automo-
bile's lesser expectation of privacy entirely on pervasive governmental regulation. California
v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2069-70 (1985). The Court reasoned that" '[a]utomobiles, unlike
homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, in-
cluding periodic inspection and licencing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police
stop and examine vehicles when licence plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other
violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted . Id. (quoting South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
47. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979). "An individual operating or traveling
in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the auto-
mobile and its use are subject to governmental regulation." Id. at 655.
48. Id. at 654. One year later the Court reaffirmed the importance of limiting officer
discretion in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). In Brown the Court recognized a need "to
assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary inva-
sions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Id. at 51. See generally
Westendorf & Westendorf, The Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to Sobriety Checkpoints,
20 IDAHO L. REV. 127 (1984) (constitutionality of drunk driver roadblocks); Note, Licence
Check Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1980) (impact of Delaware v.
Prouse on fourth amendment jurisprudence).
49. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
50. Id. at 663. Justice Brennan echoed this view in his dissent in Class: "Absent some
reason to search for the VIN, the government's admittedly strong interest in promoting high-
way safety cannot validate the intrusion resulting from the search of respondent's vehicle."
Class, 106 S. Ct. at 973 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
51. "Because the Fourth Amendment constrains the State's authority to search
automobiles under the guise of 'regulation,' the fact that the government uses the VIN as part
of its scheme for regulating automobiles is insufficient to justify a search of the passenger
compartment to retrieve such information." Id. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
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opposite direction.5 2
II. THE PLAIN VIEW IMPLICATIONS OF VIN SEARCHES
Perhaps the most significant fourth amendment concern present
when an automobile is stopped on the highway is what the officer
may view as he or she stands next to the stopped car. 3 Under Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire,54 an officer may seize any contraband or
evidence of a crime which falls within his plain view during citizen-
officer contact, including items viewed during a VIN inspection.5
The Court set forth three conditions which must be met for a
seizure to fall within the plain view doctrine: (1) there must be a
valid prior intrusion into the area where the evidence is viewed (us-
tified either by a search warrant or one of the recognized excep-
tions); 6 (2) discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent, and (3) it
must be immediately apparent to the officer that the items being
viewed are evidence of crime or criminal activity.5 7
This is the crux of the VIN inspection problem, in terms of pos-
sible infringement of fourth amendment rights. Opening the door
to access the non-visible VIN exposes most, if not all, of the car's
52. Although the Class majority claims that it reached its holding by balancing "the
governmental interests in highway safety" against the "nature and quality of the [initial]
intrusion," Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)),
the dissent accuses it of "' "balancing" into oblivion the protections the Fourth Amendment
affords.'" Id. at 971 (Brennan, I., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1065 (1983)). In light of the Court's other fourth amendment decisions involving
automobiles, it can be argued that Class is merely the continuation of a trend toward limiting
constitutional protections. See, eg., California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985) (Court justi-
fied warrantless search of motor home under automobile exception); United States v. Johns,
105 S. Ct. 881 (1985) (Court justified search of items removed from vehicle, secured three
days earlier and kept in DEA warehouse, under automobile exception); see also Wasserstrom,
The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
53. In United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1970), the court wrote: "Its
[the car's] exterior and much of its interior are within the 'plain view' of the casual or pur-
poseful onlooker, and thus are not protected by the Fourth Amendment from searching
eyes.,,
54. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the Court correctly noted that the seized evidence
will always be within the "plain view" of the officer, at least at the moment of seizure. Id. at
465. The narrower doctrine of plain view delineates the legal scope of a search which supple-
ments a prior valid intrustion. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
55. United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) (stolen Treasury checks
sitting on dashboard of car within plain view of officer conducting VIN inspection); United
States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Thus the VIN on the rear axle or on the
car frame are outside any reasonable expectations of privacy. Those that may be seen only by
opening the car door or hood are no more private: doors and hoods are continually opened to
the eyes of observers.").
56. See infra notes 63-106 and accompanying text.
57. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466-70.
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interior to the plain view of the investigating officer. 5' Although
much of the interior of a car can be seen without opening the
door,59 Class illustrates that some areas are not visible until the
door is opened.6 ° In light of the frequency of officer-motorist con-
tact during traffic stops each day, Class has created a potent law
enforcement tool.61
The requirement of a prior valid intrusion is critical to the VIN
inspection situation. It is also an area in which the Court has most
notably departed from its own precedents. Under what circum-
stances may an officer legally demand access to a vehicle's non-visi-
ble VIN, thereby enabling himself to view the interior of the vehicle
and any evidence which it may contain?62
III. DEVELOPMENT OF A STANDARD FOR ACCESS TO VINs
DURING TRAFFIC STOPS
A. Permissible Automobile Intrusions under Present Law
Although warrantless 63 governmental searches or intrusions are
58. Class held that police may search the interior of a vehicle to move papers obscuring
the dashboard VIN or to read the doorjamb VIN. New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960, 968
(1986). The Court's reasoning, however, is flawed. The Court wrote, "The VIN, which was
the clear initial objective of the officer, is by law present in one of two locations-either inside
the door jamb, or atop the dashboard and thus ordinarily in plain view ofsomeone outside the
automobile." Id. (emphasis added). Does the Court mean to suggest that the doorjamb can
be viewed when the door is closed, or that people never leave maps or papers on their dash-
boards? It is ludicrous to imagine that no other objects will be viewed, even when the door is
opened, because the VIN is the officer's "clear initial objective."
59. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a
search was not conducted when a police officer used his flashlight to look through the win-
dow of a stopped car. The officer only saw the area normally visible to "inquisitive pass-
ersby," and therefore did not infringe upon any reasonable expectation of privacy.
60. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963. The gun was protruding from underneath the passenger
seat, an area which would not have been within the plain view of the arresting officer, had the
door remained closed.
61. According to one report, there are over one million moving violations per year in
New York City. Mendelson, Arrestfor Minor Traffic Offenses, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 503-
04 (1983) (citing Report of New York City Police Department, Mayor's Management Report
(prelim. 1982)).
62. Justice Powell, concurring in Class, recognized this problem: "The question raised
on the facts of this case, therefore, is whether the Fourth Amendment was offended by the
incremental intrusion resulting from the officer's efforts to observe this VIN once respon-
dent's vehicle lawfully was stopped." Class, 106 S. Ct. at 969-70 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. "The primary reason for the warrant requirement is to interpose a 'neutral and de-
tached magistrate' between the citizen and 'the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime.' " United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305 (1984) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)) (federal agents not completely free to deter-
mine, by means of electronic device, contents of home's interior absent warrant and probable
cause or reasonable suspicion). The warrant requirement provides an objective evaluation of
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presumptively unreasonable under the fourth amendment,' the
Court has recognized that automobiles present special problems due
to their inherent mobility65 and exposure to pervasive governmental
regulation.66 As a result, the warrant requirement has been re-
moved in certain situations involving automobiles. 67 Despite this
exception, the Court has continued to require the articulation of
individualized suspicion or probable cause68 to enter the car. The
government must show some concrete basis for its intrusion into an
area of privacy.69 Recognizing the inherent difficulty in reducing
such a vague concept to a workable standard, the Court has histori-
cally required, at a minimum, a showing of reasonableness in the
circumstances to justify suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.7 °
the situation and limits the scope of the intrusion. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356
(1967) (warrantless tapping of public phone booth by federal agents held per se unreasonable
search under fourth amendment).
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (war-
rantless four day search of apartment after murder of undercover officer not within recog-
nized exception to fourth amendment warrant requirement; therefore per se unreasonable).
65. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (exigency of car's mobility justifies
waiver of warrant requirement when reasonable or probable cause exists); Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (extending Carroll mobility exception to search of immobile car,
based on inherent mobility of cars in general).
66. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 1.
68. The fourth amendment states that warrants (or, in the case of an automobile, the
right to conduct a search without a warrant) shall issue only upon probable cause. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the
arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an
offense has been or is being committed." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959)
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (probable cause justified warrant-
less arrest and subsequent search incident to arrest).
69. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2071 (1985) (DEA agents had "abundant"
probable cause to conduct warrantless search of motor home). "Under the vehicle exception
to the warrant requirement, '[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search
otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)). "In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which neces-
sarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility
justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overrid-
ing standard of probable cause is met." Id. at 2070.
70. "[B]ecause many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes .... But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclu-
sions of probability." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (emphasis added)
(defendant's prior arrest by officer and reputation for hauling liquor across state lines was
enough to show probable cause for officer to stop car and, upon admission of defendant that
he had liquor in car, to search it). "These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens
from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of
crime." Id.
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In Class, however, the majority required neither an articulized
suspicion nor reasonable suspicion to justify the warrantless search
of the defendant's car. The investigating officers even admitted that
they had no reason to suspect that the defendant's car was stolen.7'
As noted by the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, "[t]he word
'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away. "72
There are several exceptions justifying a warrantless search of a
car under present law. The following sections delineate these excep-
tions and point out why the new VIN search, by not requiring that
it be justified by an articulation of individualized suspicion, is incon-
sistent with all of the Court's precedents in this area.
1. The Automobile Exception
Under the automobile exception, an officer having probable
cause to believe a vehicle is involved in a crime or contains evidence
of a crime may stop a car and conduct a search of all areas capable
of containing such evidence.73
Despite the judicial transformation of the exception from one
based on the exigency of ready mobility and impracticability of se-
curing a warrant74 to a general exception for use in almost any case
in which an automobile is involved in crime,75 the Court has contin-
ued to require the articulation of independent probable cause to be-
lieve that the vehicle was involved in a crime. In United States v.
Ross, 76 the Court held that when a police officer could identify ob-
jective facts giving rise to a probable cause belief that the vehicle
contained contraband, a warrantless search of the car and contain-
ers therein capable of containing the contraband was justifiable
71. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963.
72. 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971).
73. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
74. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In this landmark automobile excep-
tion case, the law then in existence precluded the officers from taking the suspects into cus-
tody for a misdemeanor, so the police had either to conduct a search on the spot, or to allow
the suspects to proceed-possibly out of the jurisdiction.
75. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985) (search of mobile home allowed under
automobile exception despite ready availability of warrant); United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct.
881 (1985) (vehicle searched under automobile exception after being impounded for three
days at DEA warehouse); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search of car under
automobile exception allowed where driver in police custody, and car could not be driven
away by him).
76. 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (police, acting on information from informant that car trunk
contained narcotics, had probable cause to conduct warrantless search of entire vehicle).
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under the automobile exception.77 In such a case, police could
search the entire vehicle either on the highway where the vehicle
was stopped or later at the police station. In addition, the scope of
the search would be as broad as if a judge had issued the warrant.
A traffic violation alone, while supplying probable cause to stop
the vehicle initially, does not supply probable cause to search for a
VIN. Therefore, the VIN search rule is not justified by the automo-
bile exception.78
2. Inventory Searches
In South Dakota v. Opperman,79 the Supreme Court held that
upon impounding a vehicle, police may conduct an inventory search
of the vehicle in order to protect the police from potential danger
and claims of lost or stolen property, and also to protect the owner's
property.8" At a minimum, the vehicle must be lawfully im-
pounded.81 The inventory search cannot be a mere pretext for an
investigatory search.8"
When a driver receives a traffic ticket, however, there is no need
to impound the car unless the driver is taken into custody. 83 Ac-
cordingly, in the typical non-custodial arrest situation, the inven-
tory search exception is inapplicable to the VIN search rule.
3. Officer Safety
Under Michigan v. Long,84 the police, upon stopping a motorist
for a traffic offense, may conduct a search of those areas of the pas-
senger compartment capable of containing weapons which pose a
threat to the officer.85 The officer must possess a reasonable belief,
77. Id. at 809. The objective facts must be sufficient to "justify the issuance of a warrant
by a magistrate, and not merely [be based] on the subjective good faith of the police officers."
Id. at 808.
78. This was pointed out by Justice Brennan, dissenting in Class: "The Court supplies
not an iota of reasoning to support the holding that respondent's traffic infractions gave the
police probable cause to search for the VIN." Class, 106 S. Ct. at 972 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
79. 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (police towed and impounded defendent's car after ticketing it
for parking in restricted zone; inventory search disclosed marijuana in glove box).
80. Id. at 369.
81. Opperman cites vehicle accidents, traffic control, violation of parking ordinances,
and public safety as legitimate reasons to impound a vehicle. Id. at 368-69.
82. Id. at 376; see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973) (inventory search
was standard police procedure).
83. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text, discussing custodial arrests and VIN
searches incident to an arrest.
84. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
85. Id. at 1049.
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based upon "specific and articulable facts ... taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts" that the driver is danger-
ous and has access to those weapons during the stop.86 There must
be a specific articulation of the reasons leading the officer to fear for
his safety before a search for weapons is justifiable under the officer
safety exception. Without such articulated reasons, a VIN search
cannot be justified under this exception.8 7
4. Search Incident to Arrest
Under authority of the bright line rule developed in New York v.
Belton,88 an officer may conduct a search of both the passenger
compartment of a vehicle and any containers within it following the
full "custodial" arrest of its occupants. 89
Although the search incident to arrest doctrine9" as applied to
automobiles may appear to apply to a VIN search occurring after
an observed traffic violation and subsequent arrest, the rationale
supporting the doctrine is arguably unrelated to the average traffic
stop situation. As noted in United States v. Robinson,9 the dual
rationales behind the doctrine are to remove any weapons from the
vehicle which pose a threat to the officer and to seize any evidence
which the arrestee may try to destroy or conceal.92 The purpose of
a VIN inspection, however, is to ascertain whether the car is stolen;
there is no crime involved other than the traffic infraction and
therefore no need to search for weapons or evidence. It is also un-
likely that a full arrest would typically be effected for a traffic
86. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
87. Indeed, the Class majority had to stretch this rationale to apply it to the officer's
VIN search. Not only did the driver voluntarily leave his vehicle (and was therefore unable
to gain access to weapons in the car), but, more significantly, the officers expressed no actual
fear for their own safety. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 973 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
89. Id. at 460. Belton is significant in that the Court no longer requires exigent circum-
stances (e.g., that suspect could gain access to weapon or evidence) to justify a search. A
custodial arrest is defined as "confinement or detention by police or government authorities
during which a person is entitled to certain warnings [of the Miranda variety] as to his rights
when questioned." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (5th ed. 1979). In Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966), the Court distinguished between general investigatory on-the-scene
questioning and full custody interrogation while at the police station. Due to the "compelling
atmosphere" of the police station, full custodial interrogations require the now-famous Mi-
randa warnings. Id. at 478.
90. The doctrine originated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (upon arrest of
suspect, police may search area in home within immediate control of arrestee to prevent
access to weapons or destruction of evidence).
91. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
92. Id. at 251.
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violation.93
B. The Terry Standard and Problems of Scope
In Terry v. Ohio,94 the Court sanctioned limited intrusions into a
person's privacy based upon less than probable cause.95 However,
even under Terry's "reasonable suspicion" standard, 96 "the police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.
97
In Terry, the police were required to articulate grounds for the
initial stop.98 In the VIN search situation, however, the motorist
has typically committed some sort of traffic infraction in the pres-
ence of an officer, so the standard for seizure is easily met.99 There-
fore, the problem becomes one of scope for the search. In
determining the permissible scope of a VIN search once a valid
seizure has been made, the Terry standard requires that a court look
at the grounds for the initial seizure: the officer's search must be
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place. ' '"" ° Assuming that the VIN is
primarily used as a theft detection device,"° ' it is doubtful that, in
all routine traffic stop cases, an officer will be able to point to facts
leading to a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is stolen.1"2 A
93. Issuing a citation or conducting a full arrest is discretionary in some jurisdictions.
This may allow or even encourage pretextual searches of a vehicle's interior. Robinson, 414
U.S. at 248; see generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5. 1(h) (1978) [hereinafter W.
LAFAVE] (in most jurisdictions, officer has complete discretion in issuing citation or con-
ducting full arrest). See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1985) (allowing officer to make
custodial arrest for any traffic violation). In Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del.
1983), the Delaware Supreme Court held that an officer's use of discretion under this statute
does not, in itself, invalidate a search incident to that arrest. See also Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 345.23 (West Supp. 1986) (officer arresting driver for violation of traffic regulations shall
issue citation, and "may" release driver, or release him upon posting of appearance bond).
But see United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) ("An arrest may not be used as a
pretext to search for evidence.").
94. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (reasonably suspecting defendant about to commit crime, officer
justified in stopping defendant and conducting limited patdown search for weapons).
95. Id. at 28.
96. Terry was applied to automobiles in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63
(1979) (stop of vehicle solely to check driver's license and registration ruled unreasonable
seizure under fourth amendment).
97. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. See supra note 13.
100. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
101. See supra note 38.
102. As Justice Brennan wrote in Class, "[t]he Court suggests that respondent's traffic
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cracked windshield or a speeding car does not, in itself, indicate
that the vehicle has been stolen or involved in other crimes.
By not requiring that the grounds for a VIN search be closely
tied to an articulable suspicion stemming from either the circum-
stances surrounding the traffic stop or independent grounds arising
after the stop, 103 the Court is sanctioning "intrusions upon constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
articulate hunches .... ,104 By allowing such a practice, any traffic
stop could be turned into a VIN search at the will of the investigat-
ing officer. 105 Because of the potential for abuse of discretion 10 6 by
officers in the field, the need to establish guidelines for VIN searches
is manifest.
IV. A PROPOSED STATUTORY SOLUTION
A. Neutral Criteria
Class holds that during a lawful traffic stop the police may enter
the vehicle without the driver's consent in order to search for and
read the VIN if it is not otherwise visible from the outside. 107
Although, as shown earlier, virtually all of the Court's automobile
search and seizure cases have required the articulation of individu-
alized suspicion or probable cause in order to justify a governmental
intrusion into private spaces, the Class rule was founded upon a
"balancing of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
infractions provided the requisite probable cause .... This analysis makes a mockery of the
Fourth Amendment.... Fourth Amendment protections evaporate if this supplies the requi-
site probable cause to search for a VIN not visible from the exterior of the car." Class, 106 S.
Ct. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
103. For example, if a driver is unable to produce a license, vehicle registration, or any
other identification (United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) (car stopped for
failure to have visible license plate light), a non-consensual VIN search might be justified.
104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
662-63 (1979) ("Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time
he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seri-
ously circumscribed."); Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 24.
105. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring), Jus-
tice Blackmun recognized the "emerging tendancy on the part of the Court to convert the
Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only that any
seizure be reasonable." (footnote omitted).
106. The requirement of probable cause to conduct a search serves as a necessary safe-
guard to the citizen by neutralizing any preconceived notions-conscious or unconscious-
with which an officer may approach a particular situation. People v. Super. Ct. of Yolo
County, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 478 P.2d 449, 455, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735 (1970).
107. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968-69.
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governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' ,108 The ap-
plication of a rule that does not require objectively verifiable
grounds for the search, however, will invariably result in a finding
that the particular VIN search is justified, regardless of the circum-
stances of the incident.
In Delaware v. Prouse, °9 the Supreme Court stated that if ran-
dom highway stops for license checks were to be sanctioned as a
valid regulatory device in the absence of articulable, individualized
suspicion, there must be neutral criteria (by which to adjudge the
appropriateness of the intrusion) capable of application in each
case.110 This is consistent with the fact that search warrants, where
appropriate,"' are to be issued by a detached and neutral magis-
trate." 2 In light of the potential for abuse of discretion" 3 by of-
ficers conducting VIN inspections, the establishment of neutral
criteria would serve as an aid to both law enforcement officers and
citizens by alerting both parties to the legal scope of their respective
rights. The police officer would be spared the burden of uncertainty
and possible inadvertent violation of a motorist's rights (which
could thwart an otherwise legal operation). The driver would be
relieved of the feelings of injustice and intimidation which accom-
pany the exercise of questionable authority. 14 In short, predictabil-
ity would be promoted. As the law presently stands, a driver may
have to abandon any expectation of privacy in the car's interior
upon the occurrence of even the most minor traffic infraction." 5
This is clearly undesirable.' 6 Furthermore, although there is an
unquestioned need for flexibility and case-by-case adjudication of
108. Id. at 968 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
109. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
110. Id. at 662 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978)).
111. A close reading of the fourth amendment discloses that the amendment itself does
not require a warrant for every search. Warrants will issue only upon probable cause, to
justify an otherwise unreasonable search. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
112. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
113. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-62 (1979); see also United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (border searches of vehicles) ("The Fourth Amendment
imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.").
114. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court distinguished be-
tween checkpoint inspections and random, roving stops, noting that checkpoint stops are less
likely to frighten or annoy a motorist because the driver can see visible signs of the officer's
authority and that other vehicles are being treated similarly. Id. (citing United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975)).
115. The officer can open the door to check the VIN if it is not visible from the outside of
the car. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116. "[T]he exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one's right to be
free of unreasonable government intrusion." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974).
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fourth amendment problems,117 there is a danger of tipping the
scales too far, resulting in a "make the rules as you go" attitude. In
such a situation, the motorist is left without any fourth amendment
protections: "Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
law breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to be-
come a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means...
would bring terrible retribution."11
8
B. Less Restrictive Alternatives
Despite the fact that Class found the VIN search to involve such
a minimal intrusion as to make it reasonable when "balanced"
against the government's interest,119 the discovery of the gun illus-
trates that even a "minimal" intrusion into a private automobile
could lead to the discovery of evidence.' 20 It is submitted that, un-
less the officer can articulate individualized suspicion that the vehi-
cle is stolen, a less intrusive means should be employed in
determining whether a stopped vehicle is stolen.21
In Prouse the Court relied in part upon the availability of less
restrictive alternatives in finding random spot checks unjustifiable
under the fourth amendment.122 In the case of the VIN inspection,
likewise, there are options available which would not require or al-
low wholesale entry into the vehicle in order to identify it when no
articulable suspicion of theft exists.123 One avenue to access is
through the use of the radio check.'2 4 If a check is run on the li-
117. See supra note 27. "[T]he intensive, at times painstaking, case-by-case analysis char-
acteristic of our Fourth Amendment decisions bespeaks our 'jealous regard for maintaining
the integrity of individual rights.' " United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961)).
118. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
119. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 968.
120. The officer can seize the evidence under the Plain View Doctrine; see supra notes 53-
62 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 52.
122. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. "[Iln Delaware, as elsewhere, vehicles must carry and dis-
play current license plates, which themselves evidence that the vehicle is properly registered
.... It does not appear, therefore, that a stop ... is necessary in order to ascertain compli-
ance with the State's registration requirements .... Id. at 660 (footnotes omitted).
123. Under such an option, Class would be moot. See supra notes 17, 71 and accompany-
ing text.
124. See United States v. Matlock, 558 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir.) (radio check on license plate
of strange van confirmed it stolen), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); United States v. Jamer-
son, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant seen sleeping in van parked along highway,
radio check on license plate confirmed van stolen); United States v. Harris, 479 F.2d 508 (5th
Cir. 1973) (car observed making illegal turn, radio check after stop of car confirmed license
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cense plate of a moving or legitimately stopped vehicle and an irreg-
ularity surfaces, further inquiry and inspection is warranted.
Another way to obtain access to the interior VIN is by use of
preexisting identification statutes. Somestate laws require the pres-
entation of a driver's license or vehicle registration to the officer
during each traffic stop. 125 If, while reviewing such documents, the
officer finds a discrepancy between the information appearing on the
documents and the appearance of the vehicle or its driver, grounds
for a VIN inspection exist. 126  One argument marshalled by the
Class majority is that access to VIN information under a general
identification presentation statute is integral to a complete identifi-
cation process, 127 and a VIN search is therefore justified whenever a
vehicle is stopped for a traffic infraction. 28 The Plain View Doc-
trine, however, makes the presentation of an undisclosed VIN fun-
damentally different from the mere presentation of a document
through a car window.
plate stolen); United States v. Williams, 440 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir.) (computer check on license
plate of car parked at motel confirmed vehicle stolen), cert denied, 404 U.S. 837 (1971).
125. See, eg., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 401(4) (McKinney 1986): "4. Carrying certifi-
cate of registration. Any ... police officer may request that the operator of any motor vehicle
produce for inspection the certificate of registration... and ... any information necessary for
the identification of such vehicle and its owner, and all information required concerning his
license to operate .... (emphasis added). Section 401(4) requires the vehicle to have an
affixed validating sticker which indicates the plate number, VIN and registration expiration
date. Id. For statutes requiring display of registration upon demand see, eg.; IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-1-4-5, 34-4-32-2 (West Supp. 1986); Md. TRANsP. CODE ANN. §§ 13-409, 16-112
(Supp. 1986); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 257, 233, 257, 311 (West Supp. 1986). But see
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-305 (Supp. 1985) (In State v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 504 P.2d
548 (1972), the court held that, under the authority of an earlier but essentially identical
version of this statute, the failure to produce registration upon demand justified a limited
search for evidence of automobile ownership.).
126. Similar grounds for a VIN inspection did not exist in Class, but the search was
allowed. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 963. "Plainly the search of the interior for the VIN was unnec-
essary since respondent had supplied his car registration certificate, and there [was] no sug-
gestion that it was inadequate." Id. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, the officers did
not even record the registration information which they obtained. Id. at 972 n.2.
127. Virtually all states require the presentation of some form of identification (driver's
licence, registration, or insurance card) to the officer. However, even if there is no expecta-
tion of privacy in the VIN itself, the challenged intrusion will be exempt from the usual
fourth amendment protections only if it does not infringe upon another privacy interest. See
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1984); see also United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
128. The Class majority equates the VIN to the driver's license and registration as part
of the web of "pervasive governmental regulation," therefore acting to reduce one's expecta-
tion of privacy in his automobile. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 965 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)). "A motorist must surely expect that such regulation will on occa-
sion require the State to determine the VIN of his or her vehicle, and the individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished." Class, 106 S. Ct. at 966.
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Finally, by requiring the expression of a reasonable belief, based
on specific, articulable facts that the car is stolen (and not simply
involved in any traffic law violation), the officer may engage in an
interior VIN inspection that is consistent with the Court's previous
cases. 29 By requiring the officer to articulate the factors leading
him or her to believe that the car is stolen, a vital buffer of objectiv-
ity is placed between the unbridled discretion of an individual of-
ficer and a motorist's fourth amendment rights. 131
Although the Supreme Court has now defined the federal fourth
amendment standard for VIN searches, the states may enact stat-
utes under their constitutional provisions which provide greater
fourth amendment protections for their citizens.13 1 Indeed, this is
the only protection available.
C. Proposed Statute for Law Enforcement Access to the Vehicle
Identification Number during Stops for Traffic Law
Violations
In the interest of a uniform approach to VIN inspections among
the various states, and in light of the constitutional interests in-
volved, the following statute is proposed. If adopted, it would alle-
viate the problems described in this Note in a manner consistent
with fourth amendment law:1 32
129. See generally supra notes 63-106 and accompanying text.
130. Class, 106 S. Ct. at 972 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 122 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773
(1983) (fourth amendment standard should be objective and not dependent upon belief of
individual police officers); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 33.
131. The Court has recognized that a state may, under its state constitution, impose a
"higher standard" than that contained in the federal Constitution. See Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1044 n. 10 (1983). In Long, insufficient proof of reliance on the state standard
led the court to apply the less stringent federal fourth amendment standard. See also Cooper
v. California. 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) ("Our holding, of course, does not affect the state's
power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal
Constitution if it chooses to do so."); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (on
remand state court based its holding on state constitutional grounds, rejecting expansive
search powers formulated by United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976)); People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 51, 432 N.E.2d 745, 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d
873, 873 (1982) ("The identical wording of the two provisions [Federal and State versions of
the Fourth Amendment] does not proscribe our more strictly construing the State Constitu-
tion than the Supreme Court has construed the Federal Constutition.").
132. In Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (DEA-controlled delivery of crate con-
taining illegal drugs), the Supreme Court wrote:
In fashioning a standard [for searches], we must be mindful of three Fourth
Amendment principles. First, the standard should be workable for application by
rank-and-file, trained police officers. Second, it should be reasonable .... Third,
the standard should be objective, not dependent on the belief of individual police
officers.
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§ 1 A law enforcement official may, upon stopping a motorist
for any traffic infraction, engage in a non-consensual inspection
of a non-visible VIN only if he has a reasonable belief,133 based
on specific articulable facts, that the car is stolen. Such belief
may be based upon observations 134 occurring during the legal
traffic stop itself.
135
§ 2 In the absence of a reasonable belief that the vehicle is
stolen, law enforcement officials may utilize the following proce-
dures to obtain VIN information during traffic stops:
a) exterior inspection of visible VIN;
b) radio check on physical description of vehicle and tags;
c) inspection of auto registration and/or driver's license;
1 36
or
d) voluntary disclosure of interior VIN by driver.
Unless the display of interior VINs is specifically required
under the routine traffic stop identification provision of the state,
non-consensual interior VIN inspections shall not be construed
to fall under such general regulatory provisions.137
V. CONCLUSION
Non-consensual VIN inspections made during routine traffic
stops create a direct conflict between the need for effective law en-
forcement and a motorist's fourth amendment protections. Recog-
nizing that constitutional rights must be compromised to some
degree if we are to encourage the governmental regulation of high-
way traffic in the interest of safety, 3 ' the challenge becomes the
Id. at 772-73 (citations omitted).
133. The reasonableness requirement is consistent with the need for a case-by-case analy-
sis of fourth amendment problems since, as the Court wrote in Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931), "[t]here is no formula for the determination of rea-
sonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances." The facts and
circumstances must be scrutinized to see if they provide an articulate basis for this belief.
134. Cf. United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (after stop of vehicle for
traffic infraction, police observed suspect making furtive movements within vehicle; held, po-
lice justified in searching under driver's seat after ordering suspect from car, based upon
officer safety and automobile exceptions).
135. A "legal traffic stop" is a police stop after an observed violation of a traffic law; see
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (police observed defendant driving with
expired tags in violation of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code).
136. Since the registration (which is a required item of presentation under most state
motorist identification statutes) contains the VIN, an officer may inspect it initially and com-
pare it to the visible VIN. Absent an inconsistency between the registration and the visible
VIN, there is no need for the officer to access the interior VIN. If a discrepancy between the
registration and the visible VIN appears, an officer is then warranted in inspecting other,
perhaps non-visible VINs. In pre-1969 cars, the officer should only be able to compare the
registration with the license tag and the vehicle itself.
137. For an example of a general motor vehicle identification statute, see supra note 125.
138. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978) (warrantless inspections
1986]
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balancing of those interests. Claiming that the VIN inspection is not
a probe for evidence but merely a regulatory procedure does not
exempt it, in light of the legitimate privacy interests at stake, from
traditional fourth amendment precedents. 3 9 The present lack of
standards for guidance of both law enforcement officials and motor-
ists has created a "labyrinth of judicial uncertainty""14 regarding
the VIN inspection issue. The Supreme Court has declined to for-
mulate a workable standard, choosing instead to grant a blanket
license to law enforcement. The proposed statute provides state
guidelines to protect motorists from the unbridled discretion of field
officers "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." '141 It also provides a workable framework for investigation
of suspected auto theft.
New York v. Class has determined the federal standard for a
VIN search. Had the Court followed its own precedents in the area
of fourth amendment jurisprudence by insisting on a showing of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion for governmental intrusions,
it would have significantly clarified a confusing area of the law. In-
stead, the Court chose to condone non-consensual VIN inspections
during traffic stops in the absence of any concrete articulation of
grounds for suspicion. The Court has given the government a clear
avenue towards violating the fourth amendment rights of all motor-
ists unfortunate enough to have committed even the most minor
traffic infraction.
What the Court said seventy-two years ago still holds true
today:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
of commercial buildings under Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 held unconstitu-
tional), the Supreme Court recognized that "if the government intrudes ... the privacy inter-
est suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or
breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards."
139. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
140. W. LAFAVE, supra note 93, at § 7.2. A difference of opinion existed among the
circuits prior to Class. See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970) (non-
consensual VIN inspection is "limited inspection," opening vehicle hood or door to do so
violates no expectation of privacy); United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1970))
(Godbold, J., dissenting) (fact that VIN has quasi-public function does not exempt vehicle
from fourth amendment privacy interest); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1967) (warrantless VIN search reasonable when officer suspects car stolen); Simpson v.
United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965) (probable cause required to justify non-consen-
sual entry into automobile to copy VIN).
141. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (search of apartment based on
smell of opium emanating into hallway held unconstitutional without warrant issued by neu-
tral and detached magistrate).
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sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.1
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142. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
